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European Implications of Bankruptcy Venu-e
Shopping in the U.S.
DAVID A. S KEEL, JR.t
INTRODUCTION

For decades, the U . S . deb ate over states' efforts to
attract corporations-and over Delaware's success in that
endeavor-was mostly a sideshow for E uropean comp anies
and scholars. To be sure, there have long been worries that
charter competition might emerge in the European Union
and generate a regulatory "race to the bottom."l But the
"real seat" doctrine, which as sured that the country where a
corporation's principal operations are located would supply
its corporate law, was strongly entrenche d. Whereas U . 8.
companies that would prefer a different regulatory
framework need only reincorporate in the j urisdiction they
wish to be governed by, European comp anies were stuck
with the laws of the country where most of their operations
were located . As a result , European companies did not have
a dog in the U . S . skirmishes over charter comp etition in
corporate
law and venue
shopping in
corporate
bankruptcy . 2
t S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvani a.
Thanks to Bill Whitford for setting up this symposium, and to Horst
Eidenmuller, Luca Enriques, and Lynn LoPucki for helpful comments on an
earlier draft. Although I reach very different conclusions than LoPucki about
the significance of bankruptcy venue shopping, I am a great admirer of his
work, and a longtime beneficiary of his insights, his Bankruptcy Research
D atabase, and his friendship.
1. Concerns about charter competition were one impetus for longstanding
efforts to promote harmonization of EU members' corporate laws. See, e.g.,
VANESSA EDWARDS, EC COMPANY LAW 3 (1999).

2. The well-spring of the recent corporate charter debate was William L.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YA.LE L.J.
663 (1974) , which castigated Delaware as a "pigmy state" and called for
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Suddenly, everything has changed. Starting with the
Centros case in 1999, ED courts have issued a series of
decisions suggesting that. a company's corporate laws will
be determined by its domicile , even if most or all of the
comp any's assets and operations are locate d elsewhere.3
This means that a French o r German company can
incorporate in E nglan d to take advantage of English
corporate law, much as roughly half of the Fortune 500
companies incorporate in Delaware to assure access to
Delaware
law
and
the
privileges
of
D elaware
incorporation.4 The ED does not invite the same kind of
forum shopping in the insolvency context. But a recent E D
Insolvency Regulation that requires insolvency proceedings
to be held in a company's "centre of main interests"-or
COMI-is seen as sufficiently "fuzzy" to allow at least
limited forum shopping when a company encounters
financial distress.
Thanks to these developments , regulatory competition·
is now more of a reality in the ED than ever before .
Increasingly, European scholars are glancing across the

increased federalization of corporate law. Professor LoPucki and his co- author
Bill Whitford were the first to shine a light on venue shopping in corporate
reorganization cases . See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue
Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1l. Both debates have historical
antecedents that go back even further. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy
Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 D EL. L. REV. 1,
8-11 (1998) (describing New Deal debates over Delaware's prominence as a
court of choice for reorganization cases).
3. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, (Mar. 9.
1999) (Den.), http ://europa. eu.int/eur- lexllexiLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:61997J0212: EN:HTML. The central holding of Centros was re affirmed
in the subsequent Uberseering and Inspire Art decisions. See Case C-208/00,
Uberseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH
(NCC) (Nov. 9, 2002) (F.R.G.), http://europa.eu.intieur-lexllexiLexUriServ/
LexUriServ. do?uri=CELEX:62000J0208:EN:HTML� Case C-167/01, Kamer van
Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd. (Sep. 30, 2003)
(Neth.), http://europa.eu.intieurlexllexiLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri-C ELEX:
62001J0167:EN:HTML.
4. European companies currently have much more flexibility to choose their
domicile at the formation stage than midstream, due to tax and other barriers
that impede reincorporation . For a p ersuasive argument that many of these
barriers are likely to fall in the near future, see John Armour, Who Should
Make Corporate Law? E U Legislation versus Regulatory Competition (ESRC
Ctr. for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 307, 2005),
available at http://www.cbr. cam.ac. uk/pdf/WP307.pdf.
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Atlantic to s e e what c a n b e gleaned from the longstanding
American debates on these que stions . What does the
American evidence tell us?
When it comes to the b ankruptcy side of the equation
and in particular, D elaware's status as the venue of choice
for large corporate bankruptcies in the 1990s-Lynn
LoPucki offers a simple , decisive answer in Courting
Failure.5 Not to put too fine a point on it, LoPucki insists
"shouts" might be a better word-that venue shopping in
U . S . bankruptcy cases is a plague that spreads the disease
of corruption wherever it goes. The Delaware bankruptcy
j udges
attracted
many
of the
largest
corporate
reorganization cases in the 1990s by allowing failed
managers to remain in charge and inviting their
bankruptcy lawyers to line their own pockets in order to
entice the managers and lawyers to bring the cases in
Delaware. The process that emerged, LoPucki contends,
was rotten to the core .6 Since then , he argues, other
bankruptcy courts have adopted the same corrupt practices,
hoping to attract some of the large cases for themselve s .
LoPucki believes that this corruption has now cros sed the
Atlantic and is infecting Europe .? The new E U I nsolvency
Regulation, together with a general move toward
"universalism" in international insolvency cases, has
unleashed in Europe the same plague that has ravished the
U . S . system.s The only re sponse, he contends, is a
quarantine that requires that a separate, primary
insolvency proceeding be brought in each country where a
company's assets or op erations are located.9 This response,

5. LYNN M . LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES Is
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005).
6. Much of the debate surrounding Courting Failure has. invo lved LoPucki's
suggestion that the Delaware judges and other bankruptcy judges who have
adopted similar practices are "corrupt." Two of the contributions to this
symposium offer detailed and persuasive analyses of the corruption rhetoric and
its implications. A. Mechele D ickerson, Words that Wound: Defining, Discussing
and Defeating Bankruptcy "Corruption," 54 BUFF. L. REV. 365 (2006); Charles J.
Tabb, Courting Controversy, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 467 (2006) .

7. See LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 231.
8. See id. at 207-32.
9. See id. at 204-05.
''''�.....
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however, may be too late because the plague may already
be "global and out of control . " lO
It's a frightening story. Fortunately, much of it does not
appear to be true. A second look at LoPucki's key findings
in Courting Failure calls his interpretation of U . S.
bankruptcy venue shopping into question. The evidence
further sugge sts that the first hints of regulatory
competition in Europe should b e applauded rather than
condemned.
The centerpiece of Courting Failure is LoPucki's
celebrated and much debated finding that nearly a third of
the largest corporations that filed for bankruptcy in
D elaware in the 1990s later filed for bankruptcy a second
time. !l To LoPucki, the refilings, buttressed by his claim
that Delaware companies perform p oorly after they emerge
from bankruptcy, demonstrate a failure of the Delaware
process. 2! A closer look at the data, however, suggests that
the pattern, if there is one, may stem from differences
between the companies that filed for bankruptcy in
Delaware and those that filed elsewhere . Companies that
would most benefit from a quicker reorganization process
chose Delaware , which specialized in facilitating prompt
reorganizations .
There is no Delaware in E urope, of course, and my
conclusions cannot simply be transplanted directly into- the
European debate . But many of the same factors that
suggest that bankruptcy venue shopping has done more
good than harm in the U.S. are also relevant to the venue
shopping debate in Europe . In Europe, as in the U . S . ,
regulatory competition is likely t o have beneficial effects .
Moreover, as in the U . S . , a regime that provided added
flexibility while insuring that the choice of insolvency
regime is determined in advance would prove even more
effective .
Part I of this Article analyzes the key empirical findings
that drive LoPucki's analyses and conclusions in Co urting
Failure. Drawing on a more extensive critique co-authored
with Ken Ayotte , I argue that Delaware's repeat filings are

10. See id. at 207-32.
11. Id. at 97.
12. Id. at 116- 17.

_
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fully consistent with a model suggesting that many
companies should rationally choose a quick workout, rather
than a thoroughgoing restructuring of operations.
Moreover,
once
artificial
distortions
LoPucki's
in
calculations are corrected, the evidence that D elaware
companies performed more poorly than companies
reorganized elsewhere disappear s . 1 3 These findings also
may explain the shift in refiling rates (in particular, an
increase in refilings by companies reorganized outside of
Delaware) starting in 1997, when Delaware was stymied by
its inab ility to hire additional bankruptcy judges and other
districts had begun to adopt Delaware p ractices.
Part II considers the lessons of these findings for
Europe. One lesson is that some of the same factors that
assure that forum shopping does not have a corrosive effect
in the U.S. also offer grounds for optimism in Europe . This
is true despite the fact that the overall stakes of forum
shopping are much greater in Europe, since Member States
have very different insolvency regulations, whereas U.S.
bankruptcy judges all apply the same federal bankruptcy
law . Part II argues that a better approach would link both
corporate and insolvency regulation to a company's choice of
domicile . Part II also considers the extent to which the
current mis match between the flexibility European firms
have when it comes to corporate re gulation, as compared to
the more limited options in the insolvency context, will
distort European corporate regulation .
1.

WHAT Do THE VENUE SHOPPING DATA TELL US?

LoPucki's single most important finding in Courting
Failure-indeed, the fin ding that inspired LoPucki's
ongoing crusade against D elaware-is his discovery that
companies that reorganized in Delaware in the 1990s
tumbled back into Chapter 11 at a much greater clip than
comp anies that reorganized elsewhere. 14 "The 30 companies
that emerged from Delaware reorganization in the period
1991-96, " as he puts it, "were the reorganizations on which
Delaware had made its reputation as the nation's best
13. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr. , An Efficiency-Based Explanation
for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 u. CHI. L. REV 425 (2006)
(reviewing LOPUCKI, supra note 5) .

14. LOP1LCKl, supra note 5, at 99-100.
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bankruptcy court . . . . But by February 20, 2000, nine of
those 30 reorganizations had already failed. "15 LoPucki's
investigation of these repeat filings led to a second finding:
Delaware-reorganized companies seemed to perform
extremely badly after bankruptcy, whereas non-Delaware
reorganizations held their ground.16 In the five years after
bankruptcy, according to LoPucki's calculations , Delaware
reorganized companies averaged a 9% loss, New York
companies lost 3%, and companies reorganized elsewhere
average d a 1% profit . !7 LoPucki hangs all of his conclusions
on these two findings (the high refiling rate and large losses
suffered by Delaware-reorganized companies).
Based on the two findings , LoPucki concludes that the
Delaware j udges perverted the bankruptcy process in their
effort to attract large, high profile cases . 18 Delaware's
judges bent the rules in order to favor the interests of
debtors' managers and lawyers , and they completely
abdicated their responsibility to scrutinize the "feasibiliti'
of a proposed reorganization plan .!9 Delaware, as LoPucki
has put it, "would confirm a ham sandwich. "20 "Court
competition was not merely eroding the integrity of the
courts, it was actually destroying companies. "2 1
What should we make of the two key findings and
LoPucki's ominous conclusion about the effects of
bankruptcy venue shopping?
A. What Should the Judges Have Done?
Start with the conclusion that Delaware oversight
hastened the demise of many companies that might have
survived if the cases had been filed elsewhere. This
conclusion implies that there were decisions a non
Delaware judge might have made, but the Delaware judge
did not, during the course of the case that made a decisive

15. Id. at 100-0l.
16. Id. at 101, 112.
17. Id. at 112-13.
18. See id. at 255.
19. See id. at 140-45.
20. LoPucki made this statement at a conference at Vanderbilt University.
2l. Id. at 118.
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difference in the company's fate. If we look at the cases
LoPucki identifies as evidence of Delaware's failure, it is
not obvious what the Delaware court could or should have
done differently. 22 Spectravision, for instance, filed for
bankruptcy due to problems with the technology it used for
its pay-per-view movie services. 2 3 After emerging fro m
bankruptcy, Sp ectravision switched t o a newer technology,
but this too proved problematic . Spectravision returned to
bankruptcy, and was acquired by a competitor during its
second bankruptcy case. Spectravision's problems were not
problems that could easily have been prevented by a
bankruptcy judge.
When LoPucki was asked at the conference that gave
rise to this symposium to name a specific decision that a
Delaware judge could have made to save a viable company,
he himself could not give any examples. Even with the
benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, most of the companies
that refile d do not appear to be companies whose viability
would have been preserved by a different bankruptcy judge .
B. Does a Second Chap ter 11 Filing Sho w that the Process
Failed ?
Turn to the s moking gun, the finding that nine of the
thirty large companies that emerged from Chapter 11 in
Delaware in the years 1991-96 later landed back in
bankruptcy. LoPucki treats this finding as stark evidence of
a bankruptcy process gone amok. 2 4 Apart from the dangers
of drawing firm conclusions from such a tiny number of
cases, do repeat filings even prove that the process has
failed?

22. Douglas Baird and Bob Rasmussen have done just this, conducting brief
but careful case studies of the comp anies LoPucki points to as evidence of a
failure in Delaware. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Beyond
Recidivism, 54 BUFF. L. REV 343 (2006) ; Robert K. Rasmussen, Empirically
Bankrupt (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & E con. Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 06-07, 2006) , available at http://ssrn .comlabstract=895547.
Melissa Jacoby argues that the hands off approach taken by most bankruptcy
judges is precisely what Congress contemplated when it enacted the 1978
Bankruptcy Code. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled:
Is Corporate Reorganization Failing?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 401, 428-30 (2006) .
23. For a brief description of the Sp ectravision saga, see Ayotte & Skeel,
supra note 13, at 449-50 n.55.
24. See LO�,y CKI, supra note 5, at 101-03.
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Not necessarily . To see why, first consider the
distinctive qualities of Delaware bankruptcy in the 1990s.
I n the 1990s, D elaware was known for prep acks and
speed. 2 5 Before D elaware's ascendancy, large Chapter 1 1
cases often got off t o a languid start, followed b y a fitful
reorganization process that routinely lasted for several
years .2 6 No doubt mindful of the widespread complaints
that large cases in the 1980s were costly and overly long,
Dela ware pioneered the practice of providing swift hearings
on so-called first day orders . The first day orders provided
for ongoing p ayment of employees, retention of the d ebtor's
bankruptcy lawyers, use of cash that was collateral for a
secured bank loan, and other matters essential to
minimizing the disruption of the bankruptcy filing. 2 7
During the case, the D elaware judges stood re ady to
schedule he arings at a moment's notice . Delaware quickly
became the forum of choice for cases such as prepackaged
bankruptcies where time was thought to be of es.sence.
LoPucki initially questioned whether Delaware cases
truly were faster than reorganization cases elsewhere. 2 8
But subsequent studies have consistently found a speed
differential, and LoPucki himself now recognizes the
difference . The question, then, is whether companies would
rationally file for bankruptcy in Delaware to take
advantage of the faster process, even though a quick, low
cost Delaware reorganization might be followed by a second
Chapter 1 1 filing?

25. See Skeel, supra note 2, at 27. This does not mean that every Delaware
case was fast, of course--just that Delaware generally facilitated a prompter
reorganization process than other courts.
26. LoPucki himself offered some of the most important evidence that delay
was the biggest proble m with Chapter 11 in the 1980s, although his findings
suggested that the largest cases were not appreciably longer than large cases
before the 1978 Code . See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993
WIS. L. REV. 729.
27. See, e. g., Marvin Krasny & Kevin J. Carey, Editors Reply to an
Anonymous Letter: Why is Delaware the Venue of Choice lor Philadelphia-Based
Companies?, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 22, 1996, at 9.
28. Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An
Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 967, 983 (1999) (finding "no robust evidence in the pattern of
filings or processing times that suggests Delaware offers a more efficient forum
for resolving large Chapter 11 cases . ... ) .
"

2006]

E UROPEAN IMPLICATIONS

447

In related work, 2 9 Ken Ayotte and I develop a simple ,
formal model that assumes comp anies have a choice
whether to conduct a thoroughgoing restructuring of the
sort that LoPucki seems to think is essential in all Chapte r
11 cases (we call this a Restructuring) or a quicker , less
intensive re structuring that adjusts the company's capital
structure without restructuring the company's operations
(which we call a Workout). 3o We further a ss ume that the
parties do not know for sure whether the company will
prove to be viable after Chapter 11, and that there are three
possible future state s of the world: Good, Bad, and
Medium.31 If the Good state materialize s, the company will
prov e viable regardless of whether its bankruptcy was a
Restr ucturing or a Workout; the Bad will lead to failure
under either approach, and in the Medi um state, the
company will be viable, but only if its operations are
thoroughly reworked through a Restructuring (either in the
initial Chapter 11 case or after a subsequent filing) .3 2
Based on these quite plausible assump tions, the model
suggests that the less costly Workout may prove superior to
a more costly but more thorough Restructuring if one or
more of four conditions holds true:
1. There is a large cost differe ntia l between a
Restructuring and a Workout; (The intuition he re is that a
Workout may be preferable if it saves a great deal of
money.)33

29. Ayotte & Skeel,

supra

note 13.

30. ld. at 437-53.
31. ld. at 439.
32. Under these assumptions, the parties should choose a Workout if:
(pG + pM)(l + d) + p BL - R < p G + pM(l-R) + p BL X - L, where pG is the
probability of the Good state, pB is the probability of Bad, and pM is the
prob ability of Medium. The value of the company's curre nt cash flow in the
Good state is 1; d is the value of the company's future cash flow, as a result of a
full Restructuring, in Medium and Good states; R is th e cost of a Restructuring
and W is the cost of a Workout (and W < R); and X i s the amount of losses
incurred after bankruptcy in the event a full Restructuring is not undertaken.
See id. at 438-41. For a detailed description of the mo del, see id. at 438-40. This
formula simplifies to: (l-pB)d < (R-W) - pMR - X, which is the basis for the
conclusions described in the next paragraph . See id. at 440.
-

suggest ed
previously
was
33. This possibility
several other
by
commentators, and dismissed by LoPucki as "[p]er haps the most brazen
argument put forth on Delaware's behalf. " LOPUCKl, supra note S, at 108
�,-
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2. The lo sses that occur after the initial reorganization
and before the parties learn which state of the world has
materialized are small; (If losses will b e s.mall, the costs of
waiting to see if an intensive restructuring is necessary
may be low.)
3. The probability of the Medium state is low; (If the
odds
are
relatively
small
that
a thoroughgoing
restructuring will later be necessary, the "option value " of
waiting, rather than conducting a thorough Restructuring
and running the risk it will prove to have been unnecessary,
are high.)
4. The probability of the Bad state is high . (The
intuition here is that it may not make sense to conduct a
thoroughgoing restructuring if the o dds are high that the
company will prove unviable even after an intensive
Restructuring.) 34
The initial model assumes that there are no conflicts of
interest, and all of the parties wish to maximize the overall
value of the co mpany. In the real world, of course, things
are not so simple. A debtor's managers may wish to avoid a
thoroughgoing restructuring, for instance , since they will
generally be displaced in a Restructuring. If we add the
likelihood that managers will avoid a Restructuring if they
can, the model yields another important insight: in order to
assure that the company is fully restructured, if necessary,
cre ditors will choose a different amount of debt if the
company pursues a Restructuring in the initial bankruptcy,
than if it opts for a Workout instead . After a Restructuring,
creditors should prefer a relatively small amount of debt,
whereas they should set the debt level higher if the initial
bankruptcy is a Workout. 35
Overall, the model suggests that a bankruptcy court
that processes cases more quickly and efficiently than its
(describing the argument put forth by Bob Rasmussen and Randall Thomas,
which was later suggested in comments by Jesse Fried, that "Delaware's
refilings were not failures but merely the unfortunate, inevitable by·product of
smart risktaking") . The data described in Part I.e below suggest that LoPucki
dismissed the argument too quickly. See infra Part I.e.
34. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 13, at 440.
35. The higher debt load after a Workout is designed to force the company to
engage in a thoroughgoing Restructuring if the Medium state materializes. This
is not necessary after a Restructuring because the comp any's operations will
already have been fully restructured.
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peers will tend to attract companies that, on balance, are
more likely to fail after they complete their initial Chapter
11 case.36 These companies will tend to emerge with more
debt in their capital structure than companies that file
elsewhere and undergo a costly Restructuring. These
findings suggest an alternative explanation for a series of
empirical studies that have shown that prepackaged
bankruptcies and out-of-bankruptcy workouts do not reduce
a company's debt as much as a full-blown bankruptcy
does.37 Although the studies tend to treat the higher
leverage as a shortcoming of prepacks and workouts, the
model suggests that the high leverage may sometimes be
optimal. 38 I t keeps the debtor on a tight leash and
facilitates monitoring by the debtor's bank, lenders, or other
creditors.
In short, LoPucki supports his conclusion that the
Delaware bankruptcy court failed in the 1990s by pointing
to the high refiling rates of companies that reorganized in
Delaware .39 The high refiling rate, however, can lead to an
alternative conclusion. The model suggests that the high
rate of refilings is b est explained as a selection effect, with
companies that would benefit from a quick, low cost process
gravitating to Delaware and with other companies taking
their bankruptcy filings elsewhere.40
C. The Perfor mance of Delaware Firms After Bankrup tcy .
The analysis thus far offers a very different perspective
on-and much more p lausible interpretation of-LoPucki's

36. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 13, at 441, 443.
37. See, e.g., Stuart C. Gilson , Transactions Costs and Capital Structure
Choice: Evidence From Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161 (1997)
(finding that transaction costs discourage debt reductions by financially
distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court).
38. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 13, at 439 n . 24, 450-5l.
39. LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 97-12l.
40. These conclusions are entirely consistent with Baird and Rasmussen's
analysis of the individual cases and suggest that they do not fit LoPucki's
claims about pernicious bankruptcy court decision making. See Baird &
Rasmussen, supra note 22, at 355-62. Baird and Rasmussen emphasize the high
percentage of prepacks and prenegotiated cases in Delaware, for instance. See
id. at 347-48. These are precisely the cases that fit the Workout mode described
in the model in the previous section. See supra pp. 447-49.
--::-
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finding that Delaware's Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy system
leads to a high refiling rate for reorganized companies . But
it doesn't speak directly to LoPucki's second key claim,
comp anies
which
is
that
Delaware-reorganized
hemorrhaged cash after they emerged from Chapter 1l.41
Whereas the p roblem with the first finding is LoPucki's
interpretation, the problem with the second claim is the
finding itself. Upon further inspection, the finding proves to
be a mirage.
The mirage arises from two artificial numbers in
LoPucki's calculations . First, when corporate debtors
emerge from Chapter 1 1 , they generally use fresh start
accounting to account for the adj ustments made in Chapter
1 l. Under fresh start accounting, the difference between the
company's estimated market value and the liquidation
value of its assets is treated as an intangible asset and
amortized over time. Although this "asset" is completely
artificial, LoPucki's profitability measure treats its
a mortization as if it were a real cost, and deducts it from
profits.4 2 Second, a large portion of the losses in the
D elaware cases stemmed from asset writedowns . These
writedowns, which reset the company's accounting when it
emerges from bankruptcy, can almost always be traced to
the problems that landed the company in bankruptcy,
rather than to the bankruptcy process itself. Finally,
LoPucki's calculations deduct the interest obligations on the
comp any's debt from the profit calculations . 43 This
calculation is misleading, however, because a company's
debt is irrelevant to its operating profits . Moreover, the
calculation is p articularly prejudicial to Delaware because
Delaware-reorganized companies emerge from bankruptcy
with higher leverage than comp anies that file d elsewhere .
If we compare the Delaware reorganized companies that
emerged from bankruptcy between 1991 and 1996 to
comp anies reorganized elsewhere, using a measure that
corrects for each of these biases, the differences in
profitability are insignificant. It turns out that Delaware
did not send out leaky ship s, as compared to the sleek
schooners that emerged from other districts, after all. To

41. See LOPUCKI,

supra

42. See Ayotte & Skeel,
43. See id.

note 5, at 109-10.
supra

note 13, at 445-46.
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the contrary, Delaware appears to have offered a procedure
that fit the needs of the companies that filed there .
D . The Disappearing Delaware Effec t in the Late 1990s
For companies emerging from bankruptcy starting in
1997, the refiling rates that occupy so much of LoPucki's
attention suddenly shifted. Delaware's refiling rate
remained high-eleven of the twenty four .(46%) c.ompanies
emerging in the years 1997-2000 refiled-but the refiling
rates for other courts skyrocketed.44 Four of the six (67%)
New York cases that emerged during this period
subsequently refiled, and six of the thirteen (46%) cases
that were filed elsewhere made a return visit to Chapter
11.45 "So mething must have caused these sudden ,
simultaneous changes at the end of 1996," LoPucki marvels ,
as he surveys the new landscape. 46 ''Yet Congress made no
change in the bankruptcy laws during the relevant period
and the courts handed down no major bankruptcy
decisions. "47 What explains the disappearing Delaware
effect, and what should we make of it?
The shift in filing rates almost certainly ste ms in
important p art from the buffeting D elaware took in 1996
and 1997.48 In the summer of 1996, the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission released its initial
proposal that domicile be removed as a basis for venue .49 By
early 1997, Delaware. District Court Judge Farnan had
taken control of the assignment of Delaware bankruptcy
cases and the movement to eliminate Delaware venue was
steadily picking up stea m . Coupled with this was
D elaware's inability to do anything about its overcrowded
docket. Delaware's success had attracted a large number of
cases-too many for its two judges to easily handle. If
bankruptcy cases were a matter of state oversight,
Delaware could have simply added several new bankruptcy

44. See infra note 45.
45. See LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 120 tbl. 7.
46. Id. at 120.
47. Id. at 120-21.
48. See id. at 77-93, for a detailed chronicle of these events.
49 . See id.
...,,:�
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judgeships.5 0 But because bankruptcy is federal , Delaware
was forced to wait on Congress, which did not give
Delaware any new j udgeships until new b ankruptcy
legislation was enacted in 2005. In the meantime,
bankruptcy courts in other districts began to adopt some of
the practices that D elaware had pioneered, such as p rompt
approval of first day orders.
It is important to b e cautious about the significance we
attach to the shift in 1997, given the tiny number of cases
involved. But to the extent it reflects a meaningful
development, it suggests that Delaware had b ecome
marginally less attractive as a venue, and (at least some)
other districts were beginning to see cases that were similar
to Delaware cases and might previously have b een filed in
Delaware . 51
Notice that this conclusion is entirely consistent with
the mo del developed in the earlier sections of this Article . 5 2
If other courts began to adopt Delaware-like practices in the
late 1990s, we might expect some of the cases that would
benefit from a Workout rather than a Restructuring to go to
other courts, rather than Delaware .53 If they did, we might
expect to see more refilings in other courts, no t because the
process was failing, but because more cases where the
optimal strategy might lead to a second -filing were being
filed outside of Delaware. There also appears to have been a
shift in the kinds of cases being filed, with far fewer of the
prepackaged cases that constituted a sub stantial share of
the large Delaware cases in the 1990s.
LoPucki, of course, offers a very different diagnosis. In
his view, the skirmishes between Delaware and its
opponents starting in 1996 "focused the world's attention on
50. For an argument in favor of permitting the states to regulate corporate
bankruptcy, just as they regulate other aspects of corporate law, see David A.
Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994).
51. The recent petitions that were filed elsewhere include many of the
largest corporate scandal cases, including Enron, WorldCom and, more recently,
Refco. See In re Enron Corp ., No. 01-16034 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 2, 2001); In re
WorldCom Inc . , No . 02-13533 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 21, 2002); In re Refco Inc . , No.
05-60006-rdd (S.D. N.Y. filed Oct. 17, 2005).
52. See supra pp. 447-49.
53. Similarly, if the most difficult cases tended to go to Delaware prior to
1997, some of these cases may have begun filing elsewhere thereafter .
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the loss of cases to Delaware ."54 Other courts got on the
stick and started copying Delaware's "methods in order to
match Delaware's attractiveness . . . . As Delaware responded
by adopting changes of its own, the competition intensified,
transformed the bankruptcy system, and ultimately
corrupted additional courts. "55
The proble m with this diagnosis is that the D elaware
approach 'appears far more likely to have bee n a success
than a failure . 56 If a second bankruptcy filing in Delaware
often reflected an optimal decision to opt for a Workout
rather than a Restructuring, it is quite plausible that this
was also the case for at least some non-D elaware refilers
starting in 1997. We would need to examine the cases to
know for sure-particularly given that most other courts
could not match the D elaware judges' experience and
expertise in big cases. But LoPucki's assess ment of the
other courts, as with his indictment of Delaware, makes the
mistake of assuming that repeat filings must be evidence
that the Chapter 11 process has failed.
II.

GLOBAL AND OUT OF CONTROL?: LESSONS FOR EUROPE

Across the Atlantic , Europe is now experiencing its own
regulatory competition debate in corporate and insolvency
law. These developments are not lost on LoPucki . Indeed,
the recent course of ED Insolvency Regulation is "Exhibit
A " for LoPucki's contention that the corruption that began
in Delaware seems to have infected Europe as well, and
may be spreading throughout the world.
The European debate began with a trilogy of cases that
have dramatically increased companies' ability to choose
the corporate laws that will regulate their internal affairs.57
54. LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 122.
55. Id.
56. As Melissa Jacoby points out, there also is a temporal problem with
LoPucki's claim that Delaware corruption infected the rest of the nation. See
Jacoby, supra note 22, at 414. Although the increase in refilings by non
Delaware reorganized companies starts in 1997, LoPucki's anecdotal evidence of
efforts by other courts to compete with Delaware is based on events that do not
take place until 2000 and thereafter.
57. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v . Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, (Mar. 9,
1999) (Den.) , http://europa.eu.int/eur-lexJlexJLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:61997J0212:EN:HTML. As noted below, the central holding of Centros
-=:....:
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As two European scholars recount:
In March 1999, the European Court of Justice's decision in the
Centros case paved the way for company law arbitrage within the
ED, by granting European businesses the right to incorporate in
any ED Member State no matter where their business is run and
correspondingly preventing Member States from imposing their
own corporate law on such businesses, other than under very
limited circumstances. 5 8

In the wake of Centros and a pair of cases that
subsequently confirmed its central holding , a large numb er
of companies located in continental Europe have crossed the
English Channel to incorporate in England, apparently in
large part to evade local minimum capital rules.59
European companies have less room to maneuver with
insolvency law, but here too there are major developments
afoot . In 2000, the E C adopted a new regulation governing
insolvency proceedings .6o The new regulation contemplates
that the main insolvency proceeding will be opened in the
courts of the country where a debtor has its "centre of main
interests" (COMI), and that secondary proceedings can be
initiated in other countries where the debtor has an
establishment.61 The ED Insolvency Regulation lies at the
heart of LoPucki's claim that American-style venue
shopping may now be poised to go "global and out of

was reaffirmed in the subsequent Uberseering and Inspire Art decisions. See
Uberseering
Case
C-20S/00,
BV
v.
Nordic
Construction
Company
Baumanagement GmbH (NCC) (Nov. 9, 2002) (F.RG.), http://europa.eu.int/eur
lex/lexiLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62000J020S:EN:HTML; Case C167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art
Ltd.
(Sep. 30, 2003) (Neth.), http://europa.eu.int/eurlexilexiLexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri-CELEX:62001J0167:EN:HTML.
5S. Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter, The Relationship Between Creditors
and Corporate Debtors: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation Within the EU,
7 EuR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
59. See, e.g., Marco Becht et al., Corporate Mobility Comes to Europe-The
Evidence (Mar. 12, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13Ipapers.
cfm ?abstract_id=S90512.
60. See Council Regulation 1346/2000, European Union Regulation on
Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L160) 1 (E C).
61. Id. Article 2 defines "establishment" as "any place of operations where
the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic
activity with human means
.
and goods."
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control. "6 2 The brewing crisis , LoPucki suggests , can be
traced to two aspects of the new regulation.63 First, the new
provision nudges European insolvency regulation in a more
"univers alist "
direction,
displacing
the
traditional
In
a
"
approach.64
universalist
insolvency
regime,
"territorial
every aspect of an insolvency case is governed b y a single
set of insolvency laws, even if the comp any's assets are
locate d in a variety of different countries .65 Under
territorialis m , by contrast, the laws of each country where a
company's assets are located govern the assets that can be .
found within that country . 66 By providing for a main
proceeding in one country, rather than sep arate
procee dings of equal status in each of the relevant
countries, LoPucki argues, the insolvency regulation adopts
a universalist framework, and plants the seed of American
style forum shopping.67 "Once the court of an EU country
determines for itself that it is the debtor's home country
and declares its own case the 'main proceeding,'" he warns,
"the courts of other EU countrie s are obligated to reco gnize
it as such . "68 If the court rules that it is the appropriate
location for the main proceeding, he continues, it will be
very difficult to upset that determination, even if it is
rather dubious . 69
The second problem is the COMI standard itself.
Although the COMI test is ostensibly designed to pinpoint a
single, logical forum for any insolvency proceeding, LoPucki
argues that the parties can manipulate the COMI standard
62. See LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 207.
63. See infra notes 64-65.
64. LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 214 ("The second universalist victory came in
2000, when the European Union adopted the Regulation on Insolvency . . . . ) .
"

65. See, e.g., id. a t 208 (explaining universalism) .
66. The choice between u niversalism and territorialism has generated a
substantial debate in the legal literature. See generally Colloquy: International
Bankruptcy, Empirical Research in Commercial Transactions, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2177 (2000) . In LoPucki's contribution to the symposium, as in Courting
Failure, he excoriates the universalism favored by most legal scholars and
argues for a territorialist approach. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for
Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216
(2000) .
67. LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 214.
68. Id. at 215.
69. Id.
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at will.7° "All the case placer need do to forum shop, " he
concludes , "is make a plausible argument that the chosen
court is the 'centre of main interestsL1' " based on its
registered office, headquarters, location of employees or
operations , or assets . 71 "The chosen court will do the rest,
pondering the issues and then solemnly concluding that the
debtor is indeed correct."72 In short, the universalist
approach and the COMI standard give case placers the
incentive to seek, and Member States· to supply, an
insolvency process that favors their interests at the expense
of everyone else .
The discussion that follows begins by assuming that
LoPucki is right about one thing: the ED Insolvency
Regulation makes at least some venue shopping possible. If
so, what lessons can be taken from the American experience
and applied to the European context? The section that
follows points out some of the practical limitations on
insolvency venue shopping in the ED, and argues that the
more important question in Europe is whether the greater
flexibility to choose corporate insolvency law will distort
European regulation of corporate law and insolvency. The
final section then offers a proposal for addressing the
distortions.
A. Is European Forum Shopping Wo rrisome?
Although LoPucki overstates the likely effect of the new
ED Insolvency Re gulation, as discussed in more detail
below,73 he correctly diagnoses the general trend. The
orientation of the regulation is indeed universalist, and the
COMI standard is imprecise enough to give more than one
option as to the location of insolvency procee dings for· at
least some companies.74 What does the analysis of the
previous part tell us about the implications of the U. S.
experience for the European context?

70. See infra notes 71-72.
71. See LOPUCKI, supra note 5;

at

217·18.

72. Id. at 218.
73. See infra Part ILB.
74. See, e.g., Horst Eidenmuller, Free Choice in International Company
Insolvency Law in Europe, 6 E UR . Bus. ORG. L. REV. 423, 430 (2005) (describing
the standard as "fuzzy and manipulable").
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Start with the evidence we have seen that b ankruptcy
venue shopping is not necessarily bad, and in fact can b e
affirmatively beneficial. I n the U . S . , corporate debtors
flocked to D elaware because of the court's expertise and the
speed of the D elaware reorganization process. As we also
have seen, the p attern of repeat bankruptcy filings appears
to reflect a selection effect, where debtors that would
benefit from a prompt Chapter 11 filed their cases in
Delaware, while other companies filed in their local district.
If this is correct, it suggests that the companies that stayed
home, and those that went to Delaware, all may have made
the right filing decision.
The first question, of course, is whether we could expect
this p attern to be replicated in European insolvency cases.
The answer is probably no for the short run, but possibly
yes in the mid- or long- term. Delaware's rapid success
stemmed in important part from its role as the preeminent
state of incorporation. Although b ankruptcy is regulated .by
Congres s, corporate law belongs to the states, and
companies trust the Delaware brand and the influence of
Delaware corporate culture . 75 In Europe, by contrast, there
is no corporate "Delaware" to serve as a focal point for
insolvency venue shopping. The closest analogue is
England, which has already begun to attract a subs tantial
number of companies whose operations are located
elsewhere. Notwithstanding LoPucki's dire warnings,
however, there still are questions concerning a comp any's
ability to shift its headquarters to England at the last
minute to justify an English insolvency filing . 76 Moreover,
even after substantial recent reforms, the English
insolvency rules do not offer much of a carrot for the
managers who would need to initiate such a move , nor do
the insolvency rules of any of the other major juris dictions.
The prospect of bankruptcy venue shopping cannot be
ruled out altogether, however, which leads us to the second
75. These factors are emphasized in David A . Skeel, Jr. , Lockups and
Delaware Venue in Corporate Law and Bankruptcy, 6.8 U. GIN. L. REv. 1243,
1278 (2000) [hereinafter Skeel, Lockups] ; David A. Skeel, Jr . , What 's So Bad
About Delaware ?, 54 VAND . L. Rev . 309, 328-29 (2001) [hereinafter Skeel, What's
So Bad?] .
76. See, e.g. , Enriques & Gelter, supra note 58 (manuscript at 53, on file
with author) (noting that forum shopping is unlikely with firms whose
operations are located in only a single country).
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issue: are there serious downside risks to the possibility of
European forum shopping? The chief danger of p ermitting
comp anies to choose where to file for b ankruptcy, especially
at the last minute, is , as LoPucki so colorfully alleges, that
the comp any and its professionals will choose a location
that serves themselves but not the other constituencies of
the firm . 77 If the filing location is determined in advance, a
company's choice of filing location may be subject to market
discipline-the company may be forced to pay a higher
interest rate or bear a higher cost of equity capital when it
raises money, for instance, if any bankruptcy will be filed in
a location that favors managers and lawyers at the expense
of the comp any's other constituencies . 78 But if the managers
and lawyers are permitted to make this choice at the last
minute , they will not face the same market discipline . A
court or country that wished to attract large scale
insolvency cases could therefore invite managers and their
lawyers to help themselves to the comp any's till, without
either the thieves or the jurisdictions that love the m
needing to worry about capital market discipline.
This is the theory. The U . S . reality is quite different. As
an account of U . S . practice , especially as it has evolved in
recent years , the race to the botto m story ignore s a maj or
check on the choice of venue: the debtor-in-possession b anks
that have come to dominate the governance of the largest
Chapter 11 cases .79 As most large companie s near
bankruptcy, they are desperate for cash and turn to
existing or outside banks for financing. The bank financers
use the financing agreement to exert sub stantial control
77. LOPUCKI, supra note 5, at 133.
The lawyers and executives who choose venues for large public
companies-the case placers-are hard-nosed b usinesspeople. They
know they have something to offer: tens or hundreds of millions of
dollars of business for local bankruptcy practitioners. They expect
something in return: advantages their bankruptcy courts at home
would not give them.
78. This point, and the fact that the U.S. bankruptcy venue rule does not
require a prior commitment of this smt, is a majoy theme of Robert K.
Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping
by Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw . U . L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2000) .

79. I have discussed this phenomenon at length elsewhere. See, e.g. , Ayott e
& Skeel, supra note 13, at 462-67 (discussing lenders as influence on venue

choice) ; D avid A . Ske el, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in
Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 905 (2004) .
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over the debtor, both before and in bankruptcy. These
banks would not simply look the other way while the debtor
and its managers filed for bankruptcy in a jurisdiction that
favored their interests over those of everyone else. Indeed,
the b anks themselves often appear to be the ones who make
the venue decision.
In E urop e, corporate creditors have even more influence
in corporate and insolvency law, which suggests that we
could expect them to be at least as effective a check on
managers' filing decisions as are U. S . lenders . Indeed,
creditors currently are the ones who file most European
insolvency cases because most European countries have
manager displacing insolvency regimes .80 It is possible that
this will change as European corporate and insolvency laws
evolve . But the fact that creditors exert significant control
even in the U . S . , which has one of the world's most
manager friendly bankruptcy regimes, is strong evidence
that E uropean insolvency forum shopping is unlikely to
degenerate into a race to the botto m of the sort LoPucki
predicts .
Rather than the risk of expropriation by managers and
their lawyers, the more important concern is whether the
most influential creditors will divert value to themselve s at
the expense of other creditors . In the U. S . , this is a concern
in some contexts, but overall, creditor control has
significantly improved the Chapter 11 process . 81 Cre ditor
influence is likely to have a similarly benign influence on
European insolvency law.
There is another reason not to worry about the prospect
of European venue shopping. The new EU Insolvency
Regulation does not contemplate that the location of the
main proceeding will handle the entire insolvency case if
some or most of a comp any's operations are located
elsewhere . 82 Rather, the regulation contemplates secondary
proceedings in the other Member States where a comp any

80. See, e.g. , Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter, How the Old World
Encountered the New One: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in
European Corporate and Bankruptcy Law 67 (2006) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
81. See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel,

supra

note 13, at 464.

82. See Council Regulation 1346/2000, European Union Regulation on
Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O .J. (L1 60) 1 (EC).
,-;:....
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has an establishment. 83 These secondary proceedings
should serve as a significant protection for creditors and
other stakeholders in the Member States where the
secondary proceedings are set Up.84
B . Inso lvency Law as a Sub Rosa So urce of Company Law ?
Although LoPucki imagines that the floodgates have
opened for E uropean insolvency venue shopping, the more
salient characteristic of the new EU Insolvency Regulation
is the impediments it currently imposes on forum shopping.
Whereas U . S. law permits comp anies to select any state's
corporate law and nearly any bankruptcy venue , E uropean
companies have much more flexibility in choosing their
charter than in picking an insolvency court.85 If this
mismatch continues ,86 there are several important
implications for E uropean comp any and insolvency
regulation.
First, differential treatment of company and insolvency
regulation magnifies the significance of where a provision is
located. Lawmakers who wish to attract companies to their
country will focus on reforming comp any rather than
insolvency law because company law can be exported.
Similarly, lawmakers who wish to prevent companies that
are p hysically located in the country fro m evading
regulatory restrictions can achieve this effect through
insolvency regulation.
The most prominent illustration of the potential
consequences of whether a provision is located in company
or insolvency law is the forum shopping that has emerge d
with respect to minimum capital rules . Germany relies

83. Id.
84. See Armour,

supra

note 4, at 25.

85. The principal limitation in the U . S. stems from fe deral provision of the
bankruptcy laws. A company can choose the state that supplies its general
corporate law, and it can choose the location where it files for bankruptcy. But
the bankruptcy laws themselves are federal. For an analysis of the distortions
this creates, see Skeel, supra note 50, at 489.
86. Armour speculates that a company's registered office, its domicile, may
increasingly be presumed to be its COMI. Armour, supra note 4, at 26-29. Such
a presumption would significantly increase the scope for venue shopping,
especially if the barriers to companies' ability to shift their registered office
midstream also are removed.
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heavily on an elaborate system of minimu m cap ital rules in
its comp any law to protect creditors. This means that
companies based in Germany can evade the German cap ital
rules by incorporating elsewhere . 8 7 On the other hand, if
creditor protections are located in a country's insolvency
laws, they usually will apply even to comp anies that move
their domicile elsewhere. Thus, England's wrongful trading
rules, which are an important creditor protection for
E nglish companies, will b e much harder to evade because
the rules are located in England's insolvency law.
It is too early to tell whether the stickiness of
insolvency law will significantly alter European lawmaking.
Lawmakers cannot simply designate any provision they
wish as an insolvency p rovision. Provisions that are not
limite d to the b ankruptcy context, for instance, m ay not be
construed as insolvency provisions, and may not be applied,
even if they are carefully tucked into a country's insolvency
law. 88 The "relabeling of company law provisions as
insolvency law," in the words of two European scholars,
"may only work p rovided that these provisions are properly
'insolvencified,' i . e . so long as a (sufficient) number of
features linking them to the insolvency proceeding and its
objectives are introduced. "89 If this proposition is correct,
new provisions will only apply if a comp any does, in fact,
land in insolvency proceedings, which will limit the extent
to which lawmakers can prevent companies from avoiding
local company law rules. Limiting, however, is not the same
thing as preventing. To the extent comp any law is subject
to more regulatory competition than insolvency law, the
mismatch could distort lawmakers' regulatory focus .

87. This does not mean, however, that troubled Germany-based companies
that move their domicile to E ngland can make distributions with impunity.
Germany has fraudulent conveyance provisions in its insolvency laws that will
apply if these companies enter insolvency proceedings.
88. Provisions that might interfere with a company's "freedom of
establishment" are invalidated unless they meet the four part Ge bhard test.
Gebhard requires that a provision be (1) nondiscriminatory in its application,
(2) required by the public interest, (3) tailored to meet the public interest
concern in question, and (4) proportionate in its effect. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v.
Colsiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori de Milano, 1995 E . C .R. 1-4 165
.

89. Enriques & Gelter, supra note 58 (manuscript at 5 1, an file with author).
'.�!:..
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To Cons train o r Unleash European Regulatory
Competition

Notice the irony in the previous section. Although
LoPucki warns that the new EU insolvency rule may lead to
ruinous forum shop ping, the most pressing regulatory
issues stem from the comparative difficulty, not the ease, of
bankruptcy forum shopping. The parties' ability to choose
their comp any law, but relative inability to opt (}ut of their
local insolvency law, creates a sharp cleavage between the
effects of comp any law, on the one hand, and insolvency
regulation on the other hand. Should anything be done
about the mismatch between the EU's treatment of
comp any and insolvency law?
A response that is consistent with the spirit of
LoPucki's conclusions in Courting Failure would be for E U
decision makers to clamp down o n regulatory arbitrage in
both com pany and insolvency la w. 90 This would
reinvigorate the traditional territorialism in Europ ean
comp any and insolvency law. The country where the
comp any's main operations were located would govern all
aspects of its existence. No need to worry ab out companies
picking and choosing the laws that apply to them. This
hostility to regulatory competition, however, is problematic
for a variety of different reasons. The first is that regulatory
competition has made things better rather than worse in
the U . S . context . Stifling competition in Europe would cut
off the pos sibility of similar benefits . Second, the dangers of
European regulatory competition are quite limite d. Even if
the regulatory obstacles were removed, charter and
insolvency competition would be likely to remain less
vigorous in Europe than in the U . S . In the insolvency
context, the existence of secondary proceedings in each
other Member State where the company has an
establishment will limit the scope of the main proceeding.
In addition, cultural, language and other differences may
encourage many comp anies to stick with their home
jurisdiction both for corporate law and for any insolvency
proceeding. Finally, creditors can constrain a company's

90. LoPucki does not explicitly call for federalization of U.S . corporate law,
but his dim view of Delaware's preeminence suggests that he would favor, or at
the least would be agnostic about, retrenchment on corporate charter
competition in the U . S . , and by extension, in Europe.
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regulatory choices to some extent . A lender that is
concerned about opportunistic reincorporation to another
Member State could make reincorporation a default under
the p arties' credit agreement. Although b ankruptcy forum
shopping is more difficult to constrain, the U . S . experience
suggests that creditors will often exert s ignificant influence
over a debtor's choice of venue .
Rather than foreclosing regulatory choice altogether,
one alternative-in my view a far more promising
alternative-would preserve comp anies' flexibility to opt
into a particular nation's corporate laws by domiciling in
that nation, but would apply this choice to both corporate
law and insolvency regulation.91 Under this approach, a
company do miciled in England would be subj ect to English
insolvency law as well as E nglish company law. For a
company domiciled in Germany, both German company and
insolvency law would apply.9 2 Linking corporate and
insolvency law to domicile would sharply reduce any risk
that a company would choose an insolvency regime at the
last minute to the benefit of insiders and the detriment of
everyone else . The location and source of regulation would
be clear because it would be determined by the company's
domicile. Treating corporate and insolvency law as a
seamless web would also eliminate the regulatory
distortions that have been created by the differential
treatment of corporate and insolvency law.93
O ne obj ection to giving companies a choice of insolvency
regimes is that while large creditors can protect themselves,
the choice may be used to divert value from tort and other
9 l . I have argued elsewhere for a similar approach in the U . S . context,
suggesting that companies be required to file their bankruptcy cases in their
state of incorporation. See Skeel, supra note 2, at 37-38; Skeel, Lockups, supra
note 75, at 1275; Skeel, What's So Bad?, supra note 75, at 327. For an argument
similar to the one I make here with respect to EU regulatory competition, see
Eidenmuller, supra note 74, at 446-47.
92. If the location of a co mpany's registered office were presumptively
deemed to be its COMI, this presumption would link corporate and insolvency
law in precisely the way I have advocated.
93. By itself, the domicile-base d approach does not address the possibility
that a company might change venues on the eve of bankruptcy in order to take
advantage of another Member State's manager (and possibly shareholder)
friendly insolvency regime. As I have noted elsewhere, this concern could easily
be addressed by disallowing eve of b ankruptcy venue changes. Skeel, supra note
2, at 38.
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nonadjusting creditors. But value will be diverted from
nonadjusting creditors only to the extent that they are both
truly nonadj usting and not otherwise protected by the
efforts of larger creditors . In practice, nonadjusting
creditors can often ride on the coattails of more active
creditors. A nonadjusting creditor that is in the s ame class
as larger creditors will generally receive the same recovery,
for instance.94 Moreover, the existence of secondary
proceedings in the nonadj usting creditor's Member State
should further diminish any risk of expropriation.
The treatment of employees may seem to be an
exception to this sanguine conclusion. This is the aspect of
European insolvency regulation that varies
most
dramatically, with a few countries (like England) providing
for very little protection for employees in bankruptcy,
whereas others provide much more . The concern here is
that a country's insolvency laws may reflect a strong
national policy of protecting employees that will b e
undermined if companies with local operations can domicile
elsewhere . Even with this concern, however, there is less
than initially meets the eye . If the country applied a
consistent employment obligation, such _ as restrictions o n
laying off employees, t o all business operations within the
country, it would pre sumably b e honored so long as the
obligation were not limited to company or insolvency law.
To the extent regulatory arbitrage encouraged lawmakers
to adopt generally applicable laws rather than protections
that only applied in b ankruptcy, this effect could actually
improve existing regulation.
It is also important to emphasize the relatively limited
scope of regulatory competition . In the U . S . , where there
are few obstacles to i ncorporating in one state rather than
another, the vast maj ority of companies incorporate in their
local jurisdiction. O nly large corporations seriously consider
incorporating elsewhere , usually Delaware . 95 A similar
94. It also is worth noting that tort claims, a major class of no nadjusting
creditors in the U.S., are a much smaller factor in Europe.
95. See, e.g. , Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Ham dani, Vigorous Competition
or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112
YALE L.J. 553 (2002) (documenting that the choice for incorporation is D elaware
or a company's home state) ; Robert D aines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO
Firms, 77 N.YU L . REV. 1559 (2 002) (again documenting that the choice for
incorporation is Delaware or a company's home state).
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pattern seems likely to develop in Europe. Some companies,
for whom their home juris diction's company laws are
seriously inefficient, may incorporate elsewhere . But the
vast majority of comp anies can be expecte d to stay right
whe re they are . 96
O ne final issue also warrants mention. In the U . S . ,
differential tax rules play a relatively small role In
corporations' choice of corporate domicile, and little or no
role in their choice of b ankruptcy venue . Federal tax rates
are the same, whether a company incorporates in D elaware,
New York, or Nevada.97 In Europe, b y contrast, tax
competition figures more prominently, due to significant
differences in corporate tax rates. As a result, tax
competition may influence corporations' choice of domicile
at least as much as, and possibly more than, differences in
corporate regulation. Existing tax rules also serve as a drag
on charter competition by penalizing companies that
change their domicile midstream. Whether these tax effects
will continue as lawmakers in countries who are losing
corporations respond to the tax competition, and as the tax
rules that chill reincorporation are challenged under E D
law a s interfering with freedom of establishment, remains
to be seen.98
Either way, the underlying point about corporate and
insolvency law remains the same. The current framework,
which gives companies increasing flexibility to choose the

96. This is a major theme of Enriques and Gelter, supra note 58. See also
Luca Enriques, EC Company Law and the Fears of a European Delaware, 2004
EUR. Bus. L. REV. 1259, 1 265 (noting that cultural and political factors may
impede reincorporations in the ED) . Enriques and Gelter also argue that
Member States do not have a large incentive to compete to attract companies
because the potential benefits for any given Member State are comparatively
small.
97. Even in the U . S . , differential tax rules do come into play for a few
companies. The fact that Delaware does not impose a state tax on passive
income, for instance, attracts some companies (particularly subsidiaries of a
corporate group) to Delaware. Local tax effects also may influence non-U.S.
companies' decisions whether or when to incorporate in the U.S. For a
discussion of the greater significance of tax effects for incorporation decisions in
Europe than in the U . S . , see Edward B. Rock, Taxes and Charter Competition
(2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) .
98. For an argument that the tax impediments to reincorporation may be
struck down as interfering with freedom of establishment, see Armour, supra
note 4, at 15- 1 6 .
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company laws that apply to them, but offers less flexibility
with respect to insolvency, appears to be a step in the right
direction for E U corporate and insolvency regulation. But
the mismatch between corporate and insolvency law could
create undesirable distortion s . These distortions would be
removed if a company's choice of domicile determined b oth
the corporate and insolvency regulation that governed the
company .
This solution is directly contrary to the approach
LoPucki advocates in Courting Failure, which decries the
new regulatory competition in Europe and suggests that it
should be shut down . Our analysis of the American data
suggests that what LoPucki has condemned as problems
actually appear to be solutions . Regulatory competition has
had beneficial effects in the U . S . Although competition in
the European Union is likely to play out differently than its
U . S . analogue, the U . S . evidence sugge sts that competition
in the EU should be encouraged, not thwarted.

